In 2006, Gazprom was held responsible for all gas exports from Russia`s eastern Siberia regions, apart from sales through production sharing agreements (EPI).   This was a step further that is widely regarded as politically motivated, since the success of commercial development “The question is whether the existing treaty should be maintained as it is, start a detailed discussion and try to reach a compromise within a year or lose this treaty completely, so that we, Russia and the United States , with the rest of the world without an agreement limiting an arms race. “,” he said. I think the second option is much worse. In addition, in 2019, the Russian Prime Minister signed a decree authorizing the ministries of defense and foreign affairs to begin negotiations with the Chinese Ministry of Defence for a military cooperation agreement. There are no further details. 35 According to Vasily Kachin, the new phase of Sino-Russian military relations is likely to be “anchored in the Sino-Russian military cooperation agreement, which will replace a rather vague document signed in 1993 and which will probably be signed in the near future.”36 Russia has sought to establish a more institutionalized defence relationship with China. consultations, exchanges, exercises and agreements to codify enhanced defence cooperation. Barely a recent development, this policy of rapprochement was born in the last days of the Soviet Union and re-founded Russia`s relations with China. Building on the border delimitation and demilitarization agreements reached in the 1990s and early 2000s, the two powers have been investing for years in confidence-building measures, consultation mechanisms, defence cooperation frameworks and the direction of their foreign policy perspectives. In a gradual process, Moscow and Beijing have worked to reduce what would push the two powers to see each other as potential threats, while gradually strengthening military cooperation. It is only recently that Russia has begun to use the word “ally” to refer to China. One of the first public applications was a comment by Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov on Chinese participation in the Russian Strategic Wostok-2018 exercises: “This is a sign of a broader partnership between the two sides in all areas.” In June 2019, the Russians called the agreements signed by Putin and Xi in Moscow the opening of a “new era,” including in the context of military cooperation between the two countries.
China has not publicly corrected the Russians` statements; She probably made it clear “behind the scenes” that she did not approve of such a message, which can be inferred from what Putin said a few days later. “We don`t have a military alliance with China. We are strategic partners: we do not act against each other; We are working for the good of our partners and we have no intention of exchanging or removing anything,” Putin told the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. A similar situation occurred in the second half of the year, when Putin said on October 3, 2019, that Russia was cooperating with China to establish a common missile defense system, citing “allied relations” with Beijing. However, in December, at his annual press conference, he assured that the radar system in question was purely defensive and that Russia had no intention of forming a military alliance with China, although it is helping China`s POPULAR REPUBLIC to set up a missile warning system.